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We investigate the effect of urban network connectivity on the growth of financial centres. 
While existing research recognizes the importance of network connectivity to firms, clusters 
as well as city-regions, large sample empirical evidence is currently scarce, particularly in the 
context of financial services. We contribute to this debate by studying underwriting of equity 
and debt securities, which represent some of the core activities of financial centres. We 
operationalise our analysis using a proprietary dataset collated from Dealogic Equity Capital 
Market and Debt Capital Market databases covering over 1.7 million interactions of investment 
banks with issuers across 540 cities globally during the 1993–2016 period. We estimate our 
regression equations using the System Generalized Method of Moments estimator, which 
allows us to obtain consistent coefficient estimates on potentially endogenous regressors, 
including network connectivity variables. We identify a clear pattern of positive association 
between network centrality of financial centres and their growth. We distinguish between intra-
city and inter-city network connectivity and find that financial centres with a larger number of 
intercity network ties and assortative intra-city networks grow faster, while intra-city network 
density does not appear to affect financial centre growth. Our results on inter-city network ties 
are broadly consistent with established knowledge on cluster networks. In contrast, our findings 
on financial centres’ intra-city networks contradict previous research, which suggests that 
dense and disassortative intra-cluster networks aid economic performance of clusters.  
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Both anecdotal and empirical evidence suggests that financial services firms cluster in leading 
metropolitan areas and from these focal points of the financial system they serve clients worldwide. 
This holds in particular for investment banking (IB), corporate finance and asset management (Clark et 
al., 2017; Wójcik et al., 2018; Haberly et al., 2019). Clusters of financial services firms, conceptualised 
as financial centres (FCs) have been studied by economic geographers (Pandit et al., 2001; Cook et al., 
2007; Pažitka and Wójcik, 2019) and historians alike (Cassis, 2010) and have been shown to develop 
through a long running path dependent process, which generally lags behind the political and economic 
development of their countries. Once established, leading FCs display a great deal of stability and 
continue to function successfully, even after the economic and political power of their home countries 
fades away. In fact, history teaches us that it typically took revolutions and wars to make FCs decline 
considerably or disappear (Spufford, 2006). 
Geographers studying financial and business services (FABS) firms have long been interested 
in the phenomenon of clustering of FABS firms in urban areas (Shearmur and Doloreux, 2015), their 
networks (Taylor and Derudder, 2016) and the macroeconomic, urban and institutional factors driving 
the development of financial centres (Wójcik et al., 2018). Despite considering a plethora of factors 
affecting FC development including complementarities among services (Clark, 2002), spatial 
externalities (Cook et al., 2007), access to labour force, and institutional factors (Wójcik et al., 2018), 
research on FCs and urban networks have only very recently begun to intersect (Gemici and Lai, 2019; 
Pažitka et al., 2019; Pan et al., 2020). Despite a substantial effort being devoted to mapping urban 
networks formed by the offices of FABS (Taylor and Derudder, 2016), ownership ties among parent 
and subsidiary companies (Alderson and Beckfield, 2004), flows of foreign direct investment (Bathelt 
and Li (2014) and inter-organisational projects (Pažitka et al., 2019), empirical research on FCs still 
lacks statistical evidence linking the positioning of FCs in urban networks to their economic 
performance. The time is therefore ripe to study how urban network connectivity influences the growth 
of financial centres. This is of course not the first study in economic geography that aims to link network 
connectivity and economic performance. We could go as far back as the works of Alfred Marshall 
  
(1920) or Amin and Thrift (1992) to find pre-eminent examples of research that explicitly link network 
connectivity and economic performance. Economic geographers have studied these links empirically 
for a variety of non-financial sectors including electronics manufacturing (Giuliani et al., 2019), 
winemaking (Giuliani, 2011), software development (Trippl et al., 2009) and have fruitfully applied a 
variety of methods from social network analysis (Glückler and Doreian, 2016). Substantial progress has 
also been made with conceptualisations of the relationship between network connectivity and economic 
performance (Bathelt et al., 2004; Eisingerich et al., 2010; Ter Wal and Boschma, 2011).  
We contribute towards filling the remaining research gap by focusing our analysis on clusters 
of financial services firms involved in underwriting equity and debt securities, which represent one of 
the core activities of FCs. We estimate econometric models of growth of FCs and consider a range of 
explanatory factors including macroeconomic, institutional, localisation and urbanisation economies, 
market structure, and urban network connectivity. While several variables representing these factors 
have been considered in prior research (Pandit et al., 2001; Cook et al., 2007; Wójcik et al., 2018), we 
contribute primarily by investigating the effects of urban network connectivity. We capture inter-city 
network ties among FCs as well as the structure of their intra-city networks. We operationalise our 
analysis using a proprietary dataset collated from Dealogic Equity Capital Market (ECM) and Debt 
Capital Market (DCM) databases covering over 1.7 million market interactions of investment banks 
(IBs) with issuers between 1993 and 2016. We aggregate these transactions at the level of metropolitan 
statistical areas (MSAs), which gives us a sample of 540 MSAs - 121 in Americas, 281 in Europe, 
Middle East and Africa (EMEA) and 138 in Asia-Pacific. Our sample period covers multiple financial 
crises and recessions including the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the dot.com bubble, global financial 
crisis and the Eurozone crisis. To estimate our models, we use the System Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995). This allows us to account for the dynamics of 
FC growth and to obtain consistent coefficient estimates on potentially endogenous variables, including 
network structural variables.  
  
Our results indicate that FCs with a more central positioning in IB networks and assortative1 
intra-city network structure2 grow faster. In contrast, the density of intra-city networks or the 
concentration of revenue at the level of individual IBs is not statistically significantly related to FC 
growth. This does not mean that economies of scale and scope are not important. We in fact do find a 
positive relationship between size and growth of FCs and that FCs benefit from localisation and 
urbanisation economies. Instead, our results highlight the role of external economies of scale and scope 
through clustering of a larger number of well-connected IBs, which co-produce their services with peers 
within their FCs as well as IBs in other FCs. Our analysis also corroborates earlier work stressing the 
role of institutional factors in FC development by showing that countries which rank higher in rule of 
law and offer a lower cost of contract enforcement provide an additional competitive advantage to their 
FCs. Finally, our results highlight the positive impact of emerging economies on FC growth. 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In the next section we review relevant literature 
on FCs, investment banking, urban networks, and relate the positioning of FCs in IB networks to their 
growth and development. In the research design section, we provide an overview of our dataset and 
econometric methodology. The results section presents our econometric estimates and quantifies the 
effect of our explanatory variables on FC revenue growth. We then provide an interpretation of our 
results and relate them to the research on FCs and urban networks in the discussion section. We finish 
with conclusions and recommendations for future research.  
2. Financial centres in investment banking networks 
The state of the art in research on FCs suggests that a broad variety of factors may influence 
the development of FCs and the performance of their resident firms. These can be broadly divided to 
macroeconomic and institutional factors, localisation and urbanisation economies, market structure and 
urban network connectivity. While macroeconomic and institutional factors, localisation, urbanisation 
                                                     
1 Assortative network structures are characterised by a highly connected core and paucity of ties between the 
core and periphery of the network. Core of a network is formed by the most central (connected) actors, while the 
periphery is formed by lesser connected actors.  
2
 Intra-city network in this context is a network formed by syndication ties of IBs located in the same FC.  
  
economies and market structure have been considered in empirical research (Pandit et al., 2001; Clark, 
2002; Cook et al., 2007; Wójcik et al., 2018), evidence on urban network connectivity is currently 
limited to studies that describe networks (Gemici and Lai, 2019; Pan et al., 2020) and studies at a firm 
level (Pažitka and Wójcik, 2019). The effect of urban network connectivity on the economic 
performance of FCs therefore remains an important research gap. In order to isolate the effects of 
network connectivity, we must control for other known factors that have been linked to the development 
and growth of FCs in related research. We proceed to review related studies, identify known 
determinants of FC growth and derive testable hypotheses. These relate to both previously investigated 
factors (H.1 – H.4) and our novel results (H.5 – H.7).   
2.1 Macroeconomic and institutional factors 
Macroeconomic factors can be argued to set the tone for the opportunities afforded to FCs. 
Rapidly growing economies with ample investment opportunities and a high number of companies 
seeking access to investment capital are likely to be more conducive to FC growth and development 
than economies in decline (Cassis, 2010). Recent trends in IB revenue indicate that while FCs in the 
US and Europe have not reached their pre-crisis (2008-09) revenue levels yet, FCs in Asia and 
particularly China have enjoyed sustained growth during the last two decades and are becoming more 
significant internationally (Cassis and Wójcik, 2018). Thinking more broadly, FCs in emerging 
economies are currently benefiting from their developing stock markets and demand of their domestic 
companies for stock exchange listing and access to capital markets. In addition, companies in emerging 
economies, which used to buy complex financial services from foreign firms and FCs, are gradually 
turning to domestic providers and FCs (Wójcik et al., 2019b). 
H.1 Financial centres located in developing and emerging economies grow faster than those 
in developed economies. 
FCs require suitable institutional foundations, which offer protection for creditors and 
shareholders and thus encourage participation in financial markets (La Porta et al., 1997; Clark and 
Wójcik, 2007). Political stability, rule of law and protection of property rights are essential institutional 
pillars for the development of financial markets and FCs (Rajan and Zingales, 2003; Beck et al., 2003). 
  
Legal foundations of institutional environment rely just as much on the laws themselves, as they do on 
a reliable and predictable judiciary capable of a cost- and time-efficient enforcement of contracts (Chinn 
and Ito, 2006). Once these essential ingredients are in place, countries hosting FCs can further gain 
competitive advantage through flexible and predictable financial regulation (Lai, 2012). Currently 
available empirical evidence suggests that countries which rank higher in rule of law and offer more 
cost-efficient enforcement of contracts tend to host larger FCs (Wójcik et al., 2018) and tend to have 
higher financial services exports (Milsom et al., 2020).   
H.2a Improvement in the quality of institutional environment aids financial centre growth. 
H.2b Improvement in the cost-efficiency of contract enforcement aids financial centre growth.  
2.2 Localisation and urbanisation 
The provision of FABS is highly concentrated in the world’s leading FCs (Wójcik et al., 2019b).  
Firms located in these FCs have been documented to benefit from co-location with potential clients as 
well as co-producers and competitors (Clark, 2002; Cook et al., 2007; Urban, 2019). Clustering of 
financial services firms in FCs has been linked to higher firm growth (Pažitka and Wójcik, 2019) and 
market entry (Pandit et al., 2001). FCs are generally located within large metropolitan areas, which 
offer a large and suitably qualified labour force (Clark, 2015) as well as the necessary physical and 
digital infrastructure necessary for operating in a global marketplace (Cook et al., 2007; Wójcik et al., 
2018). Firms located in FCs enjoy positive as well as negative locational externalities and incur 
significant expenses. The substantial cost of office space in central business districts of leading FCs and 
severe competitive pressures present a challenge, in particular for new entrants and smaller firms (Cook 
et al., 2007). 
H.3a Localisation of financial and business services aids financial centre growth. 
H.3b Urbanisation economies aid financial centre growth.   
2.3 Market structure 
In order to investigate the effect of market structure of FCs on their growth, we need to 
complement the financial geography literature with a nuanced understanding of how investment 
  
banking and capital markets operate. Capital markets connect owners of capital (investors) with 
organisations that seek capital (issuers), typically in exchange for debt or equity claims in the form of 
tradeable securities. IBs operate as intermediaries in capital markets and facilitate capital flows between 
investors and issuers. Arjaliès et al. (2017) conceptualize these ties among financial intermediaries that 
ultimately connect investors and issuers as a vertically differentiated investment chain, which features 
IBs and asset managers as the key actors facilitating market interactions on behalf of their clients. The 
role of IBs in the investment chain is to facilitate the access of issuers to the securities markets by 
underwriting issues of securities and allocating them to asset managers. Asset managers on the other 
hand are responsible for allocating the investment capital of their clients to a portfolio of investment 
opportunities (Clark and Monk, 2017). These intermediation relationships put IBs in a position of 
considerable power, given that they serve in parallel as gatekeepers for both issuers and asset managers 
and exercise considerable discretionary power over the allocation of newly issued securities to asset 
managers (Jenkinson and Jones, 2009). In order to maximize their revenue potential, IBs aim to 
diversify their portfolio of clients across a variety of industries and geographical areas. This gives them 
access to a variety of market segments and allows them to more flexibly respond to variation in demand 
for their services across different industries and countries. Such efforts to cover multiple market 
segments has led to the rise of bulge-bracket IBs and the argument that economies of scale and scope 
are essential for the profitability and competitiveness of IBs (Dunbar, 2000; Shipilov, 2006; Ljungqvist 
et al., 2009). 
 H.4a Diversification of client base aids financial centre growth. 
 H.4b Increase in the concentration of market share across investment banks aids financial 
centre growth. 
2.4 Urban network connectivity 
Geographers have mapped and described urban networks formed by FABS using a variety of 
methods, from examining geographically distributed networks of offices (Taylor and Derudder, 2016), 
ownership ties among parent and subsidiary companies (Alderson and Beckfield, 2004), flows of 
foreign direct investment (Bathelt and Li, 2014) to collaboration on inter-organisational projects 
  
(Pažitka et al., 2019; Pan et al. 2020). The primary focus of studies on urban networks has been on 
intercity network connectivity, although survey-based evidence indicates that localised ties among 
FABS are also important (Cook et al., 2007), and that they are instrumental to the co-production of 
financial services within FCs (Clark, 2002). The purpose of intercity network ties is mainly to connect 
FABS with related companies, their own offices and subsidiaries in other cities, and to facilitate 
seamless service provision across borders (Alderson and Beckfield, 2004; Taylor and Derudder, 2016; 
Pažitka et al., 2019).  
In addition to the vertically differentiated investment chains connecting issuers and investors, 
IBs are also part of complex horizontal networks of syndication ties, connecting them to other IBs 
through common membership in underwriting syndicates (Pichler and Wilhelm, 2001). IBs with central 
positions in syndication networks enjoy privileged access to underwriting syndicates formed by their 
business partners  and can exercise considerable power over the membership of underwriting syndicates 
that they lead (Pollock et al., 2004; Ljungqvist et al., 2009). Coupled with the segmented nature of 
markets for securities underwriting and barriers related to financial, network, reputational and human 
resources available to individual banks, the positioning of IBs in syndication networks shapes their 
access to a variety of market opportunities (Fernando et al., 2005; Shipilov, 2006). Underwriting 
syndicates are currently the dominant form of securities underwriting (Pažitka et al., 2019) and despite 
being dissolved upon deal completion, they exhibit a high degree of persistence of network ties across 
time (Xiao and Rowley, 2002). Bookrunners are generally responsible for selecting other syndicate 
members on behalf of the issuer and behave as network architects when constructing syndication 
networks (Pollock et al., 2004). Despite the fact that leading IBs often have the capacity to underwrite 
deals individually, they typically prefer to involve other IBs to improve access of their clients to 
institutional investors willing to make long term investments in the client’s shares as well as to 
contribute to pricing of the issue (Jenkinson and Jones, 2004; Pollock et al., 2004). 
It has been hypothesised that integration into global networks can enhance the performance of 
clusters (Bathelt et al., 2004), particularly during economic downturns (Ter Wal and Boschma, 2011). 
Network ties with IBs in other geographically distant FCs are particularly valuable, given that they give 
  
IBs access to new market segments, including those beyond their immediate reach (Pažitka and Wójcik, 
2019) and can reduce the effect of information frictions in international trade (Milsom et al., 2020). 
That being said, empirical evidence suggests that the benefits of inter-cluster network ties may not be 
readily shared by well-connected firms with lesser connected firms in their proximity (Giuliani et al., 
2019). In fact, it has been documented that financial services firms with strong intercity network ties 
enjoy enhanced growth and can stifle the growth prospects of their co-located competitors (Pažitka and 
Wójcik, 2019).  
H.5 Increase in network connectivity to other financial centres aids financial centre growth. 
The internal structure of networks within FCs is likely to be equally important to their growth 
performance. The importance of internal network structure of FCs is rooted primarily in its potential to 
facilitate a co-production of services within FCs (Clark, 2002). As FCs grow, they accumulate resources 
and become more interconnected. High density of intra-cluster networks is however linked to cognitive 
and technological lock-in, thus potentially compromising future performance (Martin and Sunley, 
2011). In addition to network density, the core/periphery network structure (network assortativity) has 
been identified as critical to the performance of clusters (Suire and Vicente, 2014). FCs can either 
display assortative or disassortative internal network structures. Disassortative network structure is 
characterised by a higher propensity of nodes with many ties (core) to connect to lesser connected nodes 
(periphery), rather than to other highly connected nodes. Conversely, assortative network structures are 
characterised by a highly connected core of the network and few ties between its core and periphery. It 
has been documented that there is a high degree of persistence in the membership of underwriting 
syndicates due to the importance of trust-based business relationships. Similarly, the potential for 
reputational damage caused by failed or mismanaged issues of securities is likely to result in a 
competitive advantage of assortative network structures (Pollock et al., 2004; Ljungqvist et al., 2009). 
H.6 Increase in the density of intra-city investment banking networks aids financial centre 
growth. 
H.7 Increase in the assortativity of intra-city investment banking networks aids financial centre 
growth.    
  
3. Research design 
3.1 Data 
To measure the revenue of FCs as our dependent variable we use fees earned by IBs from 
underwriting of equity and debt securities offerings. We aggregate fees at the level of metropolitan 
statistical areas (MSAs)3. We initially sample all capital market deals available in Dealogic ECM and 
DCM databases for the period 1993 – 2016. This yields 584,680 deals in total, 100,777 for ECM and 
483,903 for DCM. For each deal we identify the issuer as well as the underwriting syndicate members 
at bank subsidiary level. Our dataset contains 15,032 bank subsidiaries and 91,879 issuers and features 
1,727,111 market interactions among them. The revenue data available in the Dealogic ECM and DCM 
databases is apportioned among individual banks conditional on their role, share of the securities 
underwritten and is representative of the revenue earned by banks from deals with a given industrial, 
geographical and size characteristics. Dealogic employs a designated data science team to manage their 
data on apportioning revenue to individual banks and their models are periodically calibrated and 
provide revenue estimates earned from individual deals with a 5% margin of error. To allocate bank 
subsidiaries to MSAs, we hand-collect data on their addresses of operational headquarters from a variety 
of sources, including Orbis, Amadeus, FAME, Bloomberg, Nexis UK and corporate websites. This 
allows us to obtain addresses of 12,827 bank subsidiaries, while the remaining 2,205 we could not 
identify. These typically relate to very small subsidiaries with typically fewer than 5 deals and without 
a traceable online footprint. The resulting missing data problem is negligible, given that 1,716,394 / 
1,727,111 (99.4%) of market interactions in our dataset are covered by bank subsidiaries for which we 
have data on headquarter location. This yields a panel dataset of 540 MSAs for 1993 – 2016. They 
represent a global sample with 121 MSAs in Americas, 281 in EMEA and 138 in Asia-Pacific. Table 1 
presents our explanatory variables, their definitions, descriptive statistics. data sources and relates 
individual variables to hypotheses.  
                                                     
3 We use the boundaries for MSAs used by Oxford Economics Global Cities 2030 database for those MSAs covered by this 
database. For the rest of our sample, we mimic this boundary setting procedure.   
  
 
 3.2 Econometric modelling methodology  
We specify a dynamic panel data model as shown in equation (1) below. This model allows us to 
study the effect of FC network structural variables (Nj) on FC revenue, while controlling for various 
determinants of FC revenue (Xk) that have been suggested by related research. Estimating a dynamic 
panel data model allows us to account for the dynamics of FC revenue by including first and second lag 
of the dependent variable yi,t-1 and yi,t-2. We use the Arellano and Bover (1995) System GMM to jointly 
estimate equations (1) and (2) below. This approach allows us to obtain consistent coefficient estimates 
even for endogenous explanatory variables, and benefits from considerably lower standard errors than 
Net revenue Net revenue [mil USD] earned from equity and debt securities 
underwriting aggregated at the level of metropolitan area. It equals to 
gross revenue net of expenses including costs of road show, 
prospectus, execution and legal costs. 
122.95 (872.21) Dealogic
Group degree centrality (inter-city) [H.5] Group degree centrality represents the number of unique ties that 
members of a group have with those outside of that group (Everett and 
Borgatti, 1999). We use location in the same MSA as a criterion for 
group membership.
37.77 (76.19) Dealogic
Network density (intra-city) [H.6] Ratio of a number of realized to a maximum potential number of ties in 
intra-city syndication networks.
0.12 (0.23) Dealogic
Network assortativity (intra-city) [H.7] Network assortativity coefficient calculated for intra-city networks of 
bank subsidiaries. Ranges from -1 (completely disassortative) to +1 
(completely assortative).
-0.72 (0.25) Dealogic
Rule of law [H.2a] Percentile ranking by a rule of law index. 75.38 (24.23) World Bank - World 
Governance Indicators 
database
Cost of enforcement of contracts [H.2b] Cost of enforcement of contracts as a percentage of claim. 23.14 (13.38) World Bank - Doing 
Business database
Client nationality Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index (HHI) [H.4]
Herfindal-Hirschman index (Rhoades, 1993) is calculated as a sum of 
squared shares of fees by client nationality. We calculate HHI 
separately for each FC and use it as a proxy for diversity of client 
base of each FC in respect to client nationality. 
0.83 (0.26) Dealogic
Client industry HHI index [H.4a] Herfindal-Hirschman index (Rhoades, 1993) is calculated as a sum of 
squared shares of fees by client general industry group (Dealogic's 
GIG classification). We calculate HHI separately for each FC and use 
it as a proxy for diversity of client base of each FC in respect to client 
industry. 
0.55 (0.32) Dealogic
Bank HHI index [H.4b] Herfindal-Hirschman index (Rhoades, 1993) calculated as a sum of 
squared shares of fees earned by underwriters of securities (Dealogic - 
bank subsidiary). We calculate HHI separately for each FC and use it 
as a proxy for diversity of client base of each FC in respect to 
concentration of revenue at bank subsidiary level. 
0.67 (0.33) Dealogic
Mcap dom. companies (% GDP) [H.1] Market capitalisation of domestic listed companies as a percentage of 
GDP.
88.63 (70.54) World Bank - World 
Development Indicators 
database.
GDP per capita [H.1] Gross domestic product per capita [USD] 32726.99 
(19933.43)
World Bank - World 
Development Indicators 
database.
FABS employment [H.3a] Employment in financial and business services [thousands of 
employees] aggregated at the level of MSAs.
320.61 (411.30) Oxford Economics 
Global Cities 2030 
database
Total employment [H.3b] Employment in all sectors [ thousands of employees ] aggregated at 




Global Cities 2030 
database
FABS specialisation Gross Value Added (FABS) / Gross Value Added (All sectors) 
measured at the level of MSAs. 
0.31 (0.08) Oxford Economics 
Global Cities 2030 
database
Source: Dealogic, World Bank, Oxford Economics
Table 1. Variable definitions, descriptive statistics and data sources




more commonly used Difference GMM estimator, when modelling highly autocorrelated series. System 
GMM estimator can utilize a set of instrumental variables (IVs) composed exclusively of internal 
instruments. This eliminates the need for external instruments and allows us to create valid instruments 
using second and higher order lagged values of potentially endogenous explanatory variables. There is 
generally a trade-off between efficiency and finite sample bias. Using higher number of IVs typically 
leads to lower standard errors, while more parsimonious sets of instruments lead to lower finite sample 
bias. We report the lag structure of GMM instruments used in our tables presenting regression results 
and conduct robustness checks using alternative lag structures of GMM instruments. We perform 
diagnostic tests for the validity of GMM instruments - the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions 
and AR(2) autocorrelation test (Arellano and Bond, 1991).  
𝑙𝑛(𝑦𝑖,𝑡) =  𝛼1 𝑙𝑛(𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛼2 𝑙𝑛(𝑦𝑖,𝑡−2) +∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑙𝑛(𝑛𝑗(𝑖,𝑡))𝑗 +∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑙𝑛(𝑥𝑘(𝑖,𝑡))𝑘 + 𝜇𝑖 +  𝜀𝑡 +  𝑣𝑖,𝑡                    (1) ln⁡(𝑦𝑖,𝑡)ln⁡(𝑦𝑖,𝑡) −  ln⁡(𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1) =  𝛼1 [𝑙 𝑛( 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1) −  𝑙 𝑛( 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−2)] + 𝛼2 [𝑙 𝑛( 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−2) −  𝑙 𝑛( 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−3)] +∑ 𝛽𝑗[𝑙𝑛(𝑛𝑗(𝑖,𝑡))𝑗  − 𝑙𝑛(𝑛𝑗(𝑖,𝑡−1))] +⁡∑ 𝛽𝑘[𝑙𝑛(𝑥𝑘(𝑖,𝑡))𝑘  − 𝑙𝑛(𝑥𝑘(𝑖,𝑡−1))] +  𝜀𝑡 +  𝑣𝑖,𝑡                                               (2)                                      
yi,t is the dependent variable (IB revenue), ni,t is a network structural variable (network centrality, density 
or assortativity, xk(i,t) are other explanatory variables, µ i is a FC fixed effect, εt is a time period fixed 
effect and vi,t is an idiosyncratic error term.  
4. Results  
4.1 Evolution of financial centres in investment banking networks 
The landscape of FCs in the early 1990s was dominated by New York, the world’s largest and 
most connected FC with significant ties to second tier financial centres in the US including Chicago, 
Boston, San Francisco, St. Louis as well as internationally. New York and London formed the network’s 
key dyad, termed the NY–LON axis (Wójcik, 2013). New York also had significant ties with Toronto, 
Paris, Frankfurt and Tokyo among others. London and Tokyo acted as the regional hubs for EMEA and 
Asia-Pacific respectively (figure 1) and Tokyo’s tie with London served as the main link between 
Europe and Asia, helping to plug the region into global financial networks. While London was the 
largest FC in Europe by revenue and maintained important intercontinental ties with both New York 
and Tokyo, continental Europe’s IB network was clearly polycentric with Frankfurt, Paris and Zürich 
  
playing key roles. Asia-Pacific was peripheral in IB networks of the early 1990s and only two of the 
region’s regional hubs – Tokyo and Hong Kong were among the largest 20 FCs. Latin America, Africa, 
Middle East and Central Asia hosted only smaller and lesser connected FCs. 
The next two decades have been truly transformative to the global IB network. We have 
witnessed a meteoric rise of FCs across Asia-Pacific and significant reshuffling in Northern America 
and Europe. Northern America experienced a decline of its second tier FCs including Chicago, Boston 
and St. Louis. Meanwhile New York consolidated its networks across a reduced number of strategically 
important FCs, namely Charlotte, Minneapolis, Toronto, London and Paris. Europe has also seen a stark 
decline of its second-tier FCs, particularly Frankfurt, Zurich, Basel and Munich. London on the other 
hand came to dominate Europe’s IB sub-network and maintained important ties with New York and 
Paris, while its ties to Frankfurt and Zurich have become less significant. In Asia-Pacific we observe 
the rise of a polycentric network of Chinese FCs with Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen and Hong Kong in 
the lead. Outside of China we see Singapore, Taipei, Seoul and Sydney joining the top 20 FCs globally 
and a relatively slower growth of Tokyo, which however remains one of the dominant FCs of the region. 
London’s previously important ties with Frankfurt, Amsterdam, Zürich and Basel among others have 
now been overtaken by more significant ties with Hong Kong and the network tie between London and 
Hong Kong has now become the most significant link between Europe and Asia, surpassing that 
between London and Tokyo.  
A pattern emerges from this descriptive analysis and network visualisations presented in figure 
1, which suggests that growth (decline) of FCs has coincided with an increase (decrease) in their urban 
network connectivity, particularly with world’s leading FCs. In order to investigate the relationship 
between urban network connectivity and FC growth further, we now proceed to formal econometric 
modelling, which controls for other relevant factors that influence the growth of FCs.      
  
 
Figure 1. Financial centres in investment banking networks. 
Notes: Regional colour coding: Americas (green), Europe, Middle East and Africa (blue), Asia-
Pacific (red). The largest 20 FCs for each year have their names displayed. Node diameters are 
proportional to the investment banking revenue earned by FCs. Edge thickness is proportional to the 
value weighted syndication ties. Node diameter and edge thickness is restricted by lower and upper 
  
limits to optimize visualisation. Only FCs with revenue of at least $10m and ties valued at least $1m 
are displayed to maintain visual clarity.  
Source: Authors’ analysis of Dealogic data.   
4.2 Macroeconomic and institutional factors 
H.1 Financial centres located in developing and emerging economies grow faster than those 
in developed economies. 
Our results on GDP per capita are consistent with an emerging market effect, meaning that FCs 
in developing and emerging economies grow faster. Our coefficient estimate on GDP per capita in table 
2 / model 5 (T2/M5) indicates that a 10% reduction in GDP per capita leads to a 2.0% increase in IB 
revenue. We also consider the market capitalisation of domestic listed companies as a percentage of 
GDP, a measure of stock market development (T2/M4). Our coefficient on this variable is however not 
statistically significant.  
H.2a Improvement in the quality of institutional environment aids financial centre growth. 
H.2b Improvement in the cost-efficiency of contract enforcement aids financial centre growth. 
The conditional mean of IB revenue increases by an estimated 17.2% per 10% increase in rule 
of law ranking4 (T2/M1). Given that rule of law is correlated with factors including stock market and 
economic development, it is conceivable that the coefficient estimate on rule of law may be inflated, 
when these factors are not controlled for. When we control for market capitalisation of domestic listed 
companies (proxy for stock market development) in T2/M4, estimated effect of rule of law falls to 
11.2% increase in IB revenue for 10% improvement in rule of law ranking. Similarly, when we control 
                                                     
4 The rule of law variable is defined as a rank of a country according to its rule of law index. Consequently, a 
negative coefficient estimate indicates that an investment banking revenue increases, as the numerical rank 
decreases, implying that the relative positioning of a country in terms of rule of law has improved. For example, 
a country moving from 10th rank to 9th rank has experienced a 10% decrease in the numerical value of its rule of 
law ranking, which we interpret as a 10% improvement in its rule of law ranking.  
  
for GDP per capita (T2/M5), the estimated effect of rule of law further falls to 3.7% increase in IB 
revenue per 10% improvement in rule of law ranking.  
We estimate that a 10% decrease in the cost of enforcement of contracts leads to a 4.5% increase 
in the conditional mean of IB revenue (T2/M1). We repeat the exercise of adding market capitalisation 
of domestic listed companies and GDP per capita to verify how this affects our coefficient estimate on 
the cost of enforcement of contracts. We find that our estimated effect on the cost of contract 
enforcement declines from a 4.5% to 2.6% increase in IB revenue per 10% decrease in the cost of 
enforcement, when we also control for the stock market development (T2/M4). In contrast, controlling 
for the GDP per capita leads to an estimated effect of 15.2% increase in IB revenue per 10% decrease 
in the cost of contract enforcement. 
4.3 Localisation and urbanisation 
H.3a Localisation of financial and business services aids financial centre growth. 
H.3b Urbanisation economies aid financial centre growth.   
To account for the benefits of localisation, we include FABS employment in a metropolitan 
area encompassing a FC. Our results indicate that a 10% increase in FABS employment leads to a 1.7% 
growth in IB revenue (T2/M7). We also conduct an additional test of this hypothesis by considering the 
relationship between growth and size of FCs, which can be derived from our coefficient estimates on 
lagged dependent variable. Positive and highly statistically significant coefficient estimates on lags of 
the dependent variable indicate that larger FCs grow faster. We test the effect of urbanisation economies 
by measuring city size by its total employment across all sectors. Our results indicate that a 10% 
increase in total city employment leads to a 2.4% increase in IB revenue (T2/M8). These results suggest 
that localisation and urbanisation economies are conducive to FC growth, rather than the specialisation 
in FABS, which is not statistically significant. 
4.4 Market structure 
H.4a Diversification of client base aids financial centre growth. 
  
H.4b Increase in the concentration of market share across investment banks aids financial 
centre growth. 
We consider the concentration of revenue on both the supply side (IBs) and the demand side 
(clients). Our coefficient estimates on the client industry HHI indicate that diversification of IB revenue, 
in terms of the industrial affiliation of their clients, leads to FC growth. We estimate that a 10% increase 
in the client industry HHI leads to a 19.0% increase in IB revenue (T2/M1). When we control for client 
nationality (T2/M2) and bank concentration (T2/M3), the estimated effect falls to 15.4%. In contrast, 
our results on the client nationality HHI and bank HHI are not statistically significant. This is perhaps 
the most noteworthy insignificant result that we obtain, suggesting that it is not essential to host large 
and dominant IBs in order to aid FC growth. We will return to this point in the discussion section.   
4.5 Urban network connectivity 
H.5 Increase in network connectivity to other financial centres aids financial centre growth. 
H.6 Increase in the density of intra-city investment banking networks aids financial centre 
growth. 
H.7 Increase in the assortativity of intra-city investment banking networks aids financial centre 
growth. 
We now proceed to examining the effect of network connectivity among FCs as well as the 
network structure within FCs on the IB revenue. In contrast to macroeconomic, institutional, 
localisation and urbanisation, network connectivity is influenced directly by IBs located in a financial 
centre. We begin with examining the effect of inter-city network connectivity among FCs. We use 
group degree centrality, which counts the number of unique IBs in other FCs that IBs within a given 
FC have formed syndication ties with in the preceding three years. Our coefficient estimate on group 
degree centrality indicates that a 10% increase in group degree centrality leads to a 1.7% increase in the 
conditional mean of IB revenue (T2/M1). This effect is reduced to 1.3% (T2/M4), when we control for 
stock market development. 
  
In addition to external network ties that span the boundaries of FCs, we consider the internal 
network structure of FCs, by including network density and network assortativity within FC intra-city 
networks. While network density can be interpreted as an indicator of how well IBs within a FC are 
connected among themselves, network assortativity relates to how well network ties within a FC 
connect the core of the intra-city network with its periphery. Our coefficient estimates on network 
density are typically positive, however they are consistently statistically insignificant, thus implying 
that changes in network density do not affect FC growth. In contrast, our coefficient estimates on 
network assortativity are consistently positive and significant, implying that FCs with assortative 
network structures grow faster. The coefficient estimate on network assortativity in T2/M1 suggests 
that a 10% increase in network assortativity leads to an 8.3% increase in IB revenue. Put simply, FCs 
with highly connected cores and only sparse ties between the core and periphery of their intra-city 
networks tend to grow faster, ceteris paribus. When we control for stock market development (T2/M4), 




β̂ *** t-stat β̂ *** t-stat β̂ *** t-stat β̂ *** t-stat β̂ *** t-stat β̂ *** t-stat β̂ *** t-stat β̂ *** t-stat
Net revenue (t-1) 0.479 *** 17.83 0.494 *** 18.05 0.499 *** 18.77 0.464 *** 16.95 0.489 *** 18.02 0.474 *** 14.60 0.470 *** 15.27 0.471 *** 15.24
Net revenue (t-2) 0.171 *** 8.02 0.177 *** 8.50 0.179 *** 8.35 0.165 *** 7.39 0.172 *** 8.24 0.187 *** 7.34 0.193 *** 6.21 0.191 *** 6.15
Group degree centrality (inter-city) 0.174 *** 4.92 0.166 *** 5.27 0.172 *** 5.59 0.140 *** 3.57 0.182 *** 5.33 0.188 *** 4.25 0.111 ** 2.57 0.125 ** 2.55
Network density (intra-city) 0.048 0.24 0.160 0.92 0.131 0.78 -0.144 -0.68 0.147 0.84 0.013 0.07 0.085 0.38 0.076 0.35
Network assortativity (intra-city) 0.840 *** 3.68 0.827 *** 4.06 0.894 *** 4.02 0.909 *** 4.06 0.837 *** 4.06 0.743 *** 2.89 0.587 ** 2.05 0.497 * 1.78
Rule of law (rank) -1.510 *** -3.80 -1.593 *** -4.25 -1.460 *** -3.88 -1.006 *** -2.64 -0.344 ** -2.35 -1.520 *** -3.22 -0.770 -1.63 -0.318 -0.54
Cost of enforcement of contracts -0.420 *** -2.82 -0.393 *** -3.12 -0.244 * -1.93 -0.240 * -1.79 -1.344 *** -4.90 -0.325 ** -2.19 -0.309 *** -2.62 -1.432 *** -3.78
Client industry HHI -1.654 *** -5.61 -1.359 *** -5.18 -1.360 *** -5.10 -1.880 *** -6.47 -1.769 *** -5.27 -1.477 *** -4.02 -0.362 *** -2.64
Client nationality HHI -0.136 -0.51
Bank HHI 0.247 1.01
Mcap dom. companies (% GDP) -0.014 -0.57
GDP per capita -0.189 *** -4.05
FABS employment 0.180 ** 2.26
Total employment 0.245 *** 2.77
FABS specialisation -0.223 -0.12
Time period
Number of cities included
Number of observartions
Sargan test [p-value]
Autocorrelation test (2) [p-value]
GMM instruments lags
Notes: *** significant at 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. All variables are transformed to a natural logarithm. All models are estimated using a System GMM estimator. All models include time period and city effects. 
Number of observations is reported as a sum of observations for equations in levels and first differences. GMM instruments lags are reported separately for the dependent variable (Y) and explanatory variables (X). 
Table 2. Dynamic panel data models of FC growth
Dependent variable: net revenue
Source: Authors' analysis of Dealogic, Oxford Economics and World Bank data.


















































In order to verify the robustness of our results on urban network connectivity, we perform the 
following three robustness checks. First, our main results are estimated using the maximum available 
number of lags of GMM instruments. This increases the precision of our estimates, but it may also lead 
to bias in coefficient estimates (Arellano and Bover, 1995). We therefore rerun our analysis using two 
and five lags of GMM instruments as an alternative specification (table 3). Our results are only 
marginally affected by changing the lag structure of GMM instruments. The estimated effect of group 
degree centrality (intercity network ties) declines from 1.67% increase in IB revenue per 10% increase 
in group degree centrality (T3/M1) to 1.65%, when we reduce the number of GMM instrument lags to 
five (T3/M2) and 1.59%, when we include two lags of GMM instruments (T3/M3). Similarly, the 
estimated effect of network assortativity declines from 8.34% (maximum number of lags of GMM 
instruments) to 7.42% (5 lags) and 7.58% (2 lags). Second, we split the time period used for our main 
analysis (1993-2016) into three sub-periods – 1993-2000 (T3/M4), 2001-2008 (T3/M5) and 2009-2016 
(T3/M6). We estimate that a 10% increase in group degree centrality leads to an average increase in IB 
revenue by 2.70% (1993-2000), 1.96% (2001-2008), 1.03% (2009-2016). This is consistent with the 
estimated effect of 1.67% for the whole sample period and it suggests that the effect of intercity network 
connectivity is decreasing over time. We estimate that a 10% increase in network assortativity increases 
IB revenue on average by 10.42% (1993-2000), 10.45% (2001-2008) and 15.57% (2009-2016), 
compared to our estimate of 8.34% for the whole sample period. Third, we split our sample into 
Americas (121 MSAs), EMEA (281) and Asia-Pacific (138). Our estimated effect of group degree 
centrality is 1.79% for Americas (T3/M7), 1.18% for EMEA (T3/M8) and 0.90% for Asia-Pacific 
(T3/M9). Our results on network assortativity display a similar regional pattern with an estimated effect 




β̂ *** t-stat β̂ *** t-stat β̂ *** t-stat β̂ *** t-stat β̂ *** t-stat β̂ *** t-stat β̂ *** t-stat β̂ *** t-stat β̂ *** t-stat
Net revenue (t-1) 0.479 *** 17.83 0.494 *** 18.07 0.499 *** 15.93 0.491 *** 10.16 0.447 *** 10.24 0.502 *** 6.73 0.460 *** 7.63 0.499 *** 13.48 0.553 *** 12.66
Net revenue (t-2) 0.171 *** 8.02 0.173 *** 7.80 0.172 *** 8.06 0.251 *** 7.37 0.231 *** 3.56 0.185 *** 4.77 0.201 *** 6.65 0.196 *** 4.59
Group degree centrality (inter-city) 0.174 *** 4.92 0.172 *** 4.27 0.166 *** 3.56 0.280 *** 4.07 0.204 ** 2.46 0.107 * 1.85 0.186 *** 2.94 0.123 *** 2.66 0.094 * 1.67
Network density (intra-city) 0.048 0.24 0.213 1.15 0.249 1.17 0.865 ** 2.52 0.510 1.61 0.392 0.92 0.229 0.61 0.224 0.92 -0.113 -0.45
Network assortativity (intra-city) 0.840 *** 3.68 0.751 *** 3.33 0.767 *** 3.01 1.040 *** 2.72 1.043 ** 2.24 1.518 *** 2.97 1.612 *** 3.60 0.614 ** 2.02 0.122 0.42
Rule of law (rank) -1.510 *** -3.80 -1.242 *** -2.75 -0.966 ** -2.02 -0.557 -0.35 -1.107 -1.58 -0.586 -0.89 0.186 0.26 0.141 0.29 -0.607 -1.57
Cost of enforcement of contracts -0.420 *** -2.82 -0.340 ** -2.12 -0.159 -0.92 -0.381 -0.93 0.330 1.48 -0.611 ** -2.01 0.798 ** 2.40 0.078 0.39 -0.434 *** -2.81
Client industry HHI -1.654 *** -5.61 -1.504 *** -5.43 -1.578 *** -4.90 -1.599 *** -3.19 -1.397 *** -2.73 -1.665 *** -2.67 -1.853 *** -2.82 -1.002 *** -2.80 -1.623 *** -4.46
Time period
Number of cities included
Number of observartions
Sargan test [p-value]
Autocorrelation test (2) [p-value]
GMM instruments lags
Table 3. Robustness checks
Dependent variable: net revenue
M1 - GMM lags 1:22 M2 - GMM lags 1:5 M3 - GMM lags 1:2 M4 - 1993-2000 M5 - 2001-2008 M6 - 2009-2016 M7 - Americas M8 - EMEA M9 - Asia-Pacific
1993 - 2016 1993 - 2016 1993 - 2016 1993 - 2000 2001 - 2008 1993 - 2016
121 281 138334
1689
2009 - 2016 1993 - 2016 1993 - 2016
2586
540 540 540 355 382
1625
1.00 1.00 0.99 0.92 1.00 0.08 1.00 1.00 1.00
1240 21196330 6330 6330 1971
0.13 0.14 0.16 0.63 0.97 0.19 0.15 0.24 0.99
3:22(Y), 1:22(X) 3:22(Y), 1:22(X) 3:22(Y), 1:22(X)
Source: Authors' analysis of Dealogic, Oxford Economics and World Bank data.
3:22(Y), 1:22(X) 3:7(Y), 1:5(X) 3:4(Y), 1:2(X) 3:7(Y), 1:7(X) 3:7(Y), 1:7(X) 3:7(Y), 1:7(X)
Notes: *** significant at 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. All variables are transformed to a natural logarithm. All models are estimated using a System GMM estimator. All models include time period and city effects. Number of observations is reported as 
a sum of observations for equations in levels and first differences. GMM instruments lags are reported separately for the dependent variable (Y) and explanatory variables (X). 
  
5. Discussion 
5.1 Macroeconomic and institutional factors 
We confirm earlier observations that FCs in developing countries have grown on average faster 
over the last three decades than those in developed countries (Cassis, 2010; Cassis and Wójcik, 2018; 
Wójcik et al., 2019ab). This is likely due to ample investment opportunities in emerging economies and 
the appetite of their companies for accessing capital markets and raising funds from investors through 
local rather than western IBs. In addition, emerging economies that have historically relied on imports 
of capital markets services increasingly offer opportunities for domestic FCs through import 
replacement of such services. The People’s Republic of China and Poland can be used as examples 
here. While they used to rely on overseas stock exchanges and foreign financial services providers to 
meet the financing needs of their large companies in the 1990s and early 2000s, with time they have 
become more self-sufficient by developing their own capital markets and increasingly sophisticated 
domestic FCs (Korczak and Korczak, 2013; Busaba et al., 2015). 
Our results corroborate the argument that FCs not only rely on solid institutional foundations, 
but they in fact perform better, if the institutional environment in their country compares favourably to 
otherwise similar countries. While previous studies consider the impact of rule of law and cost of 
contract enforcement in a country on cross-border capital market transactions (Wójcik et al., 2018) and 
exports of financial services (Milsom et al., 2020), we extend this analysis to the growth of FCs. 
Providing such empirical evidence offers further support to the thesis advanced by Rajan and Zingales 
(2003), Beck et al. (2003) and Clark and Wójcik (2007) among others, who argue that institutional 
development is a key driving force behind financial development.  
5.2 Localisation and urbanisation economies 
Clustering of FABS in urban areas has been previously linked to positive spatial externalities 
associated with co-production of services (Clark, 2002) and co-location with competitors and potential 
clients (Cook et al., 2007). Our results indicate that FCs benefit from both localisation and urbanisation 
and corroborate those of Pažitka and Wójcik (2019) and Pandit et al. (2001), who find that financial 
  
services firms located in larger FCs grow faster. Interestingly, what we find is that it is the aggregate 
employment in FABS (localisation economies) and total city employment (urbanisation economies), 
rather than the specialisation in FABS, that drive FC growth. We can interpret this as evidence for the 
benefit of labour force pooling, which offers IBs access to suitably qualified employees and talent 
(Clark, 2015).   
5.3 Market structure 
Our analysis of the impact of market structure on IB revenue growth reveals that FCs with more 
diversified client base grow faster. This helps to substantiate the argument that IBs that are better 
connected in investment chains (Arjaliès et al., 2017) and facilitate financial flows among a broader 
group of issuers and investors have an advantage in terms of access to market opportunities (Ljungqvist 
et al., 2009). We consider the concentration of revenue on both the supply side (IBs) and the demand 
side (clients) and find that not all dimensions of diversification of client base are equally important. 
While diversification by client industry has a substantial impact on FC growth, we do not find a 
statistically significant effect of diversification by country of client. Perhaps even more importantly, we 
find that the concentration of revenue at the level of individual IBs does not have a statistically 
significant effect on FC growth. This finding sits uncomfortably with the argument that in order to reap 
the benefits of economies of scale and scope, it is necessary to have very large IBs (Dunbar, 2000; 
Shipilov, 2006). Our results suggest that it is not essential to host very large IBs that dominate a FC. 
This is however not to say that economies of scale and scope are not important. In fact, we find that 
larger financial centres grow faster, which is consistent with the thesis on co-production of services in 
FCs (Clark, 2002). Instead, our results highlight the significance of external in relation to internal 
economies of scale and scope in IB. External economies realise themselves at the level of FCs, meaning 
that FCs with a large number of smaller IBs can perform equally well as those with a small number of 
large IBs, while avoiding the pitfalls of hosting too-big-to-fail banks (Ioannou et al., 2019). 
5.4 Urban network connectivity 
Our results show that the concentration of revenue at the level of IBs is not conducive to the 
growth of FCs leads to the following question: What can IBs do to aid the growth and development of 
  
the FCs that host them? Prior research suggests that the positioning of IBs in syndication networks 
shapes their access to various opportunities in the marketplace and can even give them a degree of 
control over the membership of underwriting syndicates (Pollock et al., 2004; Ljungqvist et al., 2009). 
Our results indicate that both intercity network ties and intra-city network structure of IB syndication 
networks affect FC growth. We find that FCs connected to a larger number of IBs in other FCs grow 
faster. This finding corroborates the argument that IBs with a more central positioning in syndication 
networks have better access to clients and are more likely to underwrite new issues of securities 
(Ljungqvist et al., 2009). This is at least in part because more connected IBs are better positioned to 
access a wider network of institutional investors through their syndication partners and consequently 
have more flexibility in placing their clients’ securities with a diversified group of investors (Pollock et 
al., 2004; Arjaliès et al., 2017). 
While the above result is consistent with what could be anticipated based on existing research, 
our results on the effect of intra-city network structure of FCs are at odds with some of the current 
understanding of cluster networks. We find that network density within FCs is not statistically 
significantly related to revenue growth and FCs with assortative networks grow faster. Taken together, 
these results suggest that connecting the core and periphery of IB networks within FCs is of limited 
value, in fact detrimental to FC growth. Contrary to what may be expected, our results therefore indicate 
that in the context of IB it is not essential for the most central IBs to co-syndicate deals with peripheral 
IBs. This does make sense, given that smaller and lesser connected IBs can rarely provide value added 
to underwriting syndicates and can in some instances even pose reputational risk to the lead 
underwriters (Dunbar, 2000). Conversely, IBs benefit from reciprocal and repeated syndication ties 
with reputable peers, who can broaden the group of institutional investors that can be reached by the 
underwriting syndicate (Chuluun, 2015) and facilitate access to new clients (Ljungqvist et al., 2009). 
Consequently, it appears that the key to facilitating growth of FCs is to have a well-connected and large 
enough core group of IBs, which do not just co-syndicate with their peers within their own FC, but form 
ties with IBs in other FCs and thus have access to a variety market segments and opportunities through 
their syndication networks. These findings contradict the now established understanding that a dense 
  
network of intra-cluster ties that connects the core and periphery of a cluster’s network works in tandem 
with inter-cluster linkages to aid economic performance of clusters (Bathelt et al., 2004; Giuliani, 2011; 
Suire and Vincente, 2014; Giuliani et al., 2019). This is not to say that our findings directly challenge 
these conceptualisations and empirical results, but rather it shows that existing understanding of clusters 
based mainly on studies of knowledge intensive and manufacturing industries may not be readily 
applicable in the context of financial services.  
6. Conclusions  
The main objective of this paper was to investigate the effect of urban network connectivity on 
FC growth. In order to isolate the effect of various aspects of urban network connectivity, we build a 
model of FC growth that accounts for macroeconomic and institutional factors, localisation, 
urbanisation, market structure in addition to urban network connectivity. While most of these factors 
have been studied previously (Pandit et al., 2001; Cook et al., 2007; Wójcik et al., 2018), our study 
contributes to literature by adding measures of intercity network ties and intra-city network structure of 
FCs and provides a large sample evidence on a wide range of factors influencing FC growth. In doing 
so we extend studies of FCs (Pandit et al., 2001; Wójcik et al., 2018, Wójcik et al., 2019b) by 
considering the effect of urban network connectivity and contribute to studies of urban networks of 
FABS (Taylor and Derudder, 2016; Pažitka et al., 2019) by relating the positioning of cities in these 
networks to urban economic outcomes. 
We find that FCs, which increase the number of ties with IBs in other FCs, grow faster as a 
result. This is because by expanding their syndication networks, IBs improve their access to new clients 
(Ljungqvist et al., 2009) as well as institutional investors, which helps them to place issuers’ securities 
(Pollock et al., 2004; Arjaliès et al., 2017). While this result is consistent with what could be anticipated 
based on existing research on IB networks, our results on the intra-city network structure are at odds 
with some of the current understanding of cluster networks. We find that intra-city network density 
does not affect FC growth and FCs with assortative networks grow faster. These findings contradict the 
established wisdom that a dense network of ties within a cluster works in tandem with long distance 
linkages to aid economic performance of clusters (Bathelt et al., 2004; Giuliani, 2011; Suire and 
  
Vincente, 2014; Giuliani et al., 2019). We do not suggest that our findings invalidate previous research 
on cluster networks. Instead, we would like to highlight that existing understanding of cluster networks 
in economic geography may not be readily applicable in the context of financial services. We therefore 
find it necessary to inform research on FCs with insights from literature on investment banking 
networks, which provides us with the necessary micro-economic foundations to conceptualise FCs in 
IB networks. 
The findings of this study have important implications for practitioners working in IB. Network 
ties that connect FCs are a double-edged sword. They help FCs grow by linking them to market 
segments in new geographical areas and aid to diversify their client base. This process can however be 
reversed, if FCs encounter barriers to cooperation at distance. One doesn’t have to go far to find suitable 
examples. BREXIT is currently posing numerous challenges to London’s cross-border ties with 
European FCs. The COVID-19 pandemic has led to substantial barriers to international travel as well 
as face to face communication. Such barriers to urban network connectivity therefore pose a threat to 
future growth prospects of FCs, particularly those that rely heavily on their network ties with other FCs 
and overseas clients. This may therefore lead to a decline of international financial centres, unless their 
IBs can find ways to overcome these barriers and to maintain their international connections and 
clientele. 
Our results are subject to several limitations. While we are interested in the effect of positioning 
of FCs in urban networks on their growth, we investigate this phenomenon in a specific context of IB 
and syndication networks. Despite the previously cited role of IBs as indicator species within the wider 
ecosystem of FABS firms and their important function as gatekeepers of capital markets, our focus on 
IBs is nevertheless only one of several potential angles of approaching this research problem. As 
mentioned in the introduction, FCs evolve and grow over long periods of time, and therefore long-time 
series of data are more suitable to study the effect of factors that are proposed to influence their growth 
and development. Our data for 1993 to 2016 covers a variety of conditions in capital markets including 
several crises, but future research should ideally use much longer time series, when suitable datasets 
become available. Finally, our network structural variables are constructed using data on underwriting 
  
syndicates, which is only one of several ways that has been used to model urban networks. It would 
certainly be a worthwhile exercise to consider other methods of modelling urban network connectivity.  
There are several directions that could be pursued in future research. First, it would be very 
interesting to investigate network connections among different types of FABS, including accounting, 
law and management consultancy firms and their implications for FC development. Second, given that 
some of our results contradict the established knowledge on cluster networks, it would be invaluable to 
verify our results on network density and network assortativity using alternative datasets, time periods 
or types of financial services. Third, it would be also interesting to see future research to investigate the 
link between revenue concentration at firm level and performance of FCs, particularly given that our 
findings suggest that hosting too-big-to-fail banks does not aid FC growth. We hope that future research 
will build on this study to further refine our understanding of FCs and urban networks.     
References 
Alderson ASS and Beckfield J (2004) Power and Position in the World City System. American 
Journal of Sociology 109(4): 811–851.  
Amin A and Thrift N (1992) Neo‐Marshallian Nodes in Global Networks*. International Journal of 
Urban and Regional Research 16: 571–587. 
Arellano M and Bond S (1991) Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence 
and an Application to Employment Equations. The Review of Economic Studies 58(2): 277–297. 
Arellano M and Bover O (1995) Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of error-
components models. Journal of Econometrics 68(1): 29–51. 
Arjaliès D-L, Grant P, Hardie I, MacKenzie D and Svetlova E (2017) Chains of Finance: How 
Investment Management is Shaped. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Bathelt H and Li PF (2014) Global cluster networks—foreign direct investment flows from Canada to 
China. Journal of Economic Geography 14(1): 45–71. 
Bathelt H, Malmberg A and Maskell P (2004) Clusters and knowledge: local buzz, global pipelines 
  
and the process of knowledge creation. Progress in Human Geography 28: 31–56. 
Busaba WY, Guo L, Sun Z and Yu T (2015) The dark side of cross-listing: A new perspective from 
China. Journal of Banking & Finance 57: 1–16. 
Boschma R (2015) Towards an Evolutionary Perspective on Regional Resilience. Regional Studies 
49(5): 733–751. 
Cassis Y (2010) Capitals of Capital: The Rise and Fall of International Financial Centres 1780-2009. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Cassis Y and Wójcik D (2018) International Financial Centres after the Global Financial Crisis and 
Brexit. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Chuluun T (2015) The role of underwriter peer networks in IPOs. Journal of Banking & Finance 51: 
62–78. 
Clark GL (2002) London in the European financial services industry: Locational advantage and 
product complementarities. Journal of Economic Geography 2(4): 433–453.  
Clark GL and Wójcik D (2007) The Geography of Finance: Corporate Governance in the Global 
Marketplace. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Clark GL (2015) The Components of Talent: Company Size and Financial Centres in the European 
Investment Management Industry. Regional Studies 50(1): 168–181. 
Clark GL and Monk AHB (2017) Institutional Investors in Global Capital Markets. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Cook GAS, Pandit NR, Beaverstock JV, Taylor PJ and Pain K (2007) The role of location in 
knowledge creation and diffusion: Evidence of centripetal and centrifugal forces in the City of 
London financial services agglomeration. Environment and Planning A 39(6): 1325–1345. 
Dunbar CG (2000) Factors affecting investment bank initial public offering market share. Journal of 
Financial Economics 55(1): 3–41. 
Eisingerich AB, Bell SJ and Tracey P (2010) How can clusters sustain performance? The role of 
  
network strength, network openness, and environmental uncertainty. Research Policy 39: 239–
253. 
Everett MG and Borgatti SP (1999) The centrality of groups and classes. The Journal of 
Mathematical Sociology 23(3): 181–201. 
Fernando CS, Gatchev VA and Spindt PA (2005) Wanna dance? How firms and underwriters choose 
each other. The Journal of Finance 60(5): 2437–2469. 
Gemici K and Lai KPY (2019) How ‘global’ are investment banks? An analysis of investment 
banking networks in Asian equity capital markets. Regional Studies 54(2): 149–161. 
  Giuliani E (2011) Role of technological gatekeepers in the growth of industrial clusters: Evidence 
from Chile. Regional Studies 45(10): 1329-1348. 
Giuliani E, Balland PA, Matta A (2019) Straining but not thriving: understanding network dynamics 
in underperforming industrial clusters. Journal of Economic Geography 19: 147–172.  
Glückler J and Doreian P (2016) Editorial: social network analysis and economic geography—
positional, evolutionary and multi-level approaches. Journal of Economic Geography 16(6): 1123–
1134. 
Haberly D, MacDonald-Korth D, Urban M and Wójcik D (2019) Asset management as a digital 
platform industry: A global financial network perspective. Geoforum 106: 167–181. 
Ioannou S, Wójcik D and Dymski G (2019) Too-Big-To-Fail: Why megabanks have not become 
smaller since the global financial crisis? Review of Political Economy 31(3): 356–381.  
Jenkinson T and Jones H (2004) Bids and allocations in European IPO bookbuilding. The Journal of 
Finance 59(5): 2309–2338. 
Jenkinson T and Jones H (2009) IPO pricing and allocation: A survey of the views of institutional 
investors. Review of Financial Studies 22(4): 1477–1504.  
Korczak A and Korczak P (2013) The development of emerging stock markets and the demand for 
cross-listing. Journal of Empirical Finance 24: 63–77. 
  
La Porta R, Lopez-De-Silanes F, Shleifer A and Vishny RW (1997) Legal determinants of external 
finance. The Journal of Finance 52(3): 1131–1150. 
Ljungqvist A, Marston F and Wilhelm WJ (2009) Scaling the hierarchy: How and why investment 
banks compete for syndicate co-management appointments. Review of Financial Studies 22(10): 
3978–4007. 
Marshall A (1920) Principles of Economics. London: MacMillan and Co. 
Martin R and Sunley P (2011) Conceptualizing cluster evolution: Beyond the life cycle model? 
Regional Studies 45(10): 1299–1318. 
Milsom L, Pažitka V, Roland I and Wójcik D (2020) Gravity in international finance: Evidence from 
fees on equity transactions. London School of Economics - Centre for Economic Performance 
discussion paper # CEPDP1703. Available at 
https://cep.lse.ac.uk/_new/publications/abstract.asp?index=7123 
Pan F, Bi W, Liu X and Sigler TJ (2020) Exploring financial centre networks through inter-urban 
collaboration in high-end financial transactions in China. Regional Studies 54(2): 162–172. 
Pandit NR, Cook GAS and Swann PGM (2001) The Dynamics of industrial clustering in British 
financial services. The Service Industries Journal 21(4): 33–61. 
Pažitka V and Wójcik D (2019) Cluster dynamics of financial centres in the UK: Do connected 
firms grow faster? Regional Studies 53(7): 1017–1028. 
Pažitka V, Wójcik D, Knight ERW (2019) Critiquing construct validity in world city network 
research: Moving from office location networks to inter-organizational projects in the modeling 
of intercity business flows. Geographical Analysis. Epub ahead of print 19 December 2019. 
DOI: 10.1111/gean.12226. 
Pichler P and Wilhelm W (2001) A theory of the syndicate: Form follows function. The Journal of 
Finance 56(6): 2237–2264. 
Pollock TG, Porac JF and Wade JB (2004) Constructing deal networks: Brokers as network 
  
“architects” in the U.S. IPO market and other examples. Academy of Management Review 29(1): 
50–72. 
Rhoades SA (1993) The Herfindahl-Hirschman index. Federal Reserve Bulletin 79: 188–189. 
Shearmur R and Doloreux D (2015) Knowledge-intensive business services (KIBS) use and user 
innovation: High-order services, geographic hierarchies and internet use in Quebec’s 
manufacturing sector. Regional Studies 49(10): 1654–1671. 
Shipilov AV (2006) Network strategies and performance of Canadian investment banks network 
strategies and performance of Canadian investment banks. Academy of Management Journal 
49(3): 590–604.  
Spufford P (2006) From Antwerp and Amsterdam to London: The decline of financial centres in 
Europe. De Economist 154: 143–175. 
Suire R and Vicente J (2014) Clusters for life or life cycles of clusters: in search of the critical 
factors of clusters’ resilience. Entrepreneurship and Regional Development 26(1-2): 142–164.  
Taylor PJ and Derudder B (2016) World City Network: A Global Urban Analysis (2nd ed.) London 
and New York: Routledge. 
Ter Wal ALJ and Boschma R (2011) Co-evolution of firms, industries and networks in space. 
Regional Studies 45(7): 919–933. 
Trippl M, Tödtling F and Lengauer L (2009) Knowledge sourcing beyond buzz and pipelines: 
evidence from the Vienna software sector. Economic Geography 85: 443-462. 
Urban MA (2019) Placing the Production of Investment Returns: An Economic Geography of Asset 
Management in Public Pension Plans. Economic Geography 95:5: 494-518.  
Wójcik D (2013) The dark side of NY–LON: Financial centres and the global financial crisis. 
Urban Studies 50(13): 2736–2752.  
Wójcik D, Knight ERW and Pažitka V (2018) What turns cities into international financial centres? 
Analysis of cross-border investment banking 2000–2014. Journal of Economic Geography 
  
18(1): 1-33. 
 Wójcik D, Knight ERW, O'Neill P and Pažitka V (2019a) Economic geography of investment 
banking since 2008: The geography of shrinkage and shift. Economic Geography 94(4): 376–
399.  
Wójcik D, Pažitka V, Knight ERW and O’Neill P (2019b) Investment banking centres since the 
global financial crisis: New typology, ranking and trends. Environment and Planning A: 
Economy and Space 51(3): 687-704. 
Xiao LS and Rowley TJ (2002) Inertia and evaluation mechanisms in interorganizational partner 
selection: Syndicate formation among U.S. investment banks. The Academy of Management 
Journal 45(6): 1104–1119. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
